-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Hash: SHA1





=============================================================================

CERT(*) Advisory CA-95:13

Original issue date: October 19, 1995

Last revised:   September 23, 1997 

                Updated Copyright statement



        

              A complete revision history is at the end of this file.



Topic: Syslog Vulnerability - A Workaround for Sendmail

- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------



The CERT Coordination Center has received reports of problems with the

syslog(3) subroutine. To the best of our current knowledge, the problem is

present in virtually all versions of the UNIX Operating System except the

following:



          Sony's NEWS-OS 6.X

          SunOS 5.5 (Solaris 2.5)

          Linux with libc version 4.7.2, released May 1995



We have received reports indicating that the vulnerability is being exploited

with a script that has been written to be used with sendmail.



This advisory includes a workaround that you can use with sendmail. It

*does not* include workarounds for any other programs that use the syslog(3)

subroutine--telnetd, ftpd, httpd, etc.



The CERT Coordination Center recommends installing all appropriate

syslog-related patches as soon as they are available from vendors. But, in

the meantime, we suggest addressing at least the syslog problem in sendmail by

installing sendmail version 8.7.1. We are aware that several workarounds

concerning the syslog vulnerability have been published on the Internet, but

the CERT staff has not formally evaluated them.



We will update this advisory as we receive additional information.

Please check advisory files regularly for updates that relate to your site.

- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------



I.   Description



     The syslog(3) subroutine uses an internal buffer for building messages

     that are sent to the syslogd(8) daemon. This subroutine does no range

     checking on data stored in this buffer. It is possible to overflow the

     internal buffer and rewrite the subroutine call stack. It is then

     possible to execute arbitrary programs.



     This problem is present in virtually all versions of the UNIX

     Operating System except the following:



        Sony's NEWS-OS 6.X

        SunOS 5.5 (Solaris 2.5)

        Linux with libc version 4.7.2 released in May, 1995



     The sendmail(8) program uses the syslog(3) subroutine, and a script has

     been written and is being used to exploit the vulnerability.



II.  Impact



     Local and remote users can execute commands. Prior access to the system

     is not needed. Exploitation can lead to root access.



III. Solution



     We recommend that you do all of A, B, and C.



     A. Install syslog patches from your vendor when they become available.



        Information we received from vendors as of the issue date of this

        advisory  is attached as Appendix A. We will update the appendix as

        vendors send updated information.



        When you install patches, you will need to recompile/relink any

        programs built on your system that have been compiled without shared

        libraries, that is, compiled statically. Be especially careful of

        programs that contain their own versions of the syslog(3) subroutine.

        You may need to do significant extra work to compile those programs to

        use the vendor-supplied patches.



     B. Install sendmail version 8.7.1.



        NOTE: This workaround addresses the syslog(3) vulnerability in

              sendmail only. The vulnerability still exists in all other

              programs that use syslog(3).



        When your vendor(s) provides a patch, we recommend that you rebuild

        sendmail version 8.7.1 with the patched syslog(3) and place that

        newly compiled version into service.



        Sendmail is available by anonymous FTP from



        http://info.cert.org/pub/tools/sendmail/

        http://ftp.cs.berkeley.edu/ucb/sendmail/

        http://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/mirrors/ftp.cs.berkeley.edu/ucb/sendmail/

        http://ftp.cert.dfn.de/pub/tools/net/sendmail/



        Checksum:



           MD5 (sendmail.8.7.1.tar.Z) = 4a66d07a059d1d5af5e9ea53ff1b396a



        Depending upon your currently installed sendmail program, switching to

        a different sendmail may require significant effort (such as rewriting

        the sendmail.cf file). See Section VI for additional notes on

        installation.



        In addition, Sections IV and V below contain scripts for building

        sendmail 8.7.1 for SunOS 4.1.X and Solaris 2.X, respectively.



     C. Install smrsh.



        To restrict the sendmail program mailer facility, install and

        use the sendmail restricted shell program (smrsh). We recommend

        that you do this regardless of whether you use the vendor's supplied

        sendmail or you install sendmail version 8.7.1.



        Smrsh is now included in the sendmail 8.7.1 distribution in the

        subdirectory smrsh. See the RELEASE_NOTES file for a description

        of how to integrate smrsh into your sendmail configuration file.



        Please note that although smrsh does not address the vulnerability

        described in this advisory, a description of smrsh is provided for

        completeness. We recommend that you install and use smrsh with *all*

        versions of sendmail.



IV. Building this package for SunOS 4.1.X



    Here is a script that is given as an illustration of how to build

    sendmail 8.7.1 for SunOS 4.1.X. Please refer to READ_ME in the src

    subdirectory for a more complete explanation of other options available

    during the compilation process.



    % uname -sr

    SunOS 4.1.2

    % ls

    sendmail.8.7.1.tar.Z

    % zcat sendmail.8.7.1.tar.Z | tar xf -

    % cd sendmail-8.7.1/src

    % ./makesendmail LIBS='-lresolv' DBMDEF='-DNDBM -DNIS' \

        INCDIRS= LIBDIRS= sendmail

      Configuration: os=SunOS, rel=4.1.2, rbase=4, arch=sun4, sfx=

      Creating obj.SunOS.4.1.2.sun4 using Makefile.SunOS

      Making dependencies in obj.SunOS.4.1.2.sun4

      Making in obj.SunOS.4.1.2.sun4

      ...



    See Section VI for final installation steps.



V.  Building this package for Solaris 2.X



    Here is a typescript that is given as an illustration for how to build

    sendmail 8.7.1 for Solaris 2.X. Note that this procedure assumes that

    you have the GNU gcc system. The examples below used gcc version 2.6.3.

    Again, please refer to READ_ME in the src sub-directory for a more

    complete explanation of other options available during the compilation

    process.



    % uname -sr

    SunOS 5.4

    % ls

    sendmail.8.7.1.tar.Z

    % zcat sendmail.8.7.1.tar.Z | tar xf -

    % cd sendmail-8.7.1/src

    % ./makesendmail LIBS='-lresolv -lsocket -lnsl -lelf' \

        INCDIRS= LIBDIRS= sendmail

      Configuration: os=SunOS, rel=5.4, rbase=5, arch=sun4, sfx=

      Creating obj.SunOS.5.4.sun4 using Makefile.SunOS.5.4

      Making dependencies in obj.SunOS.5.4.sun4

      ...



    Note: If you wish sendmail version 8.7.1 to use the aliases and

    configuration file directory conventions from SunOS 5.4, use the

    following command:



          ./makesendmail LIBS='-lresolv -lsocket -lnsl -lelf' \

            ENVDEF='-DSOLARIS=204 -DUSE_VENDOR_CF_PATH' INCDIRS= \

            LIBDIRS= sendmail



VI. Final Installation Notes



    Sendmail can then be installed and configured with new configuration

    files as needed. We strongly recommend that if you change to sendmail

    8.7.1, you also change to the configuration files that are provided with

    that version.



    Significant work has been done to make this task easier. It is now

    possible to build a sendmail configuration file (sendmail.cf) using

    the configuration files provided with this release. Consult the

    cf/READ_ME file for a more complete explanation. We recommended that you

    create your configuration files using this method because it provides a

    technique for incorporating any future changes to sendmail into your

    configuration files.



    In addition, we recommend that you recreate your configuration file

    (sendmail.cf) using the configuration files provided with 8.7.1.



    Finally, for Sun users, a paper is available to help you convert your

    sendmail configuration files from the Sun version of sendmail to one that

    works with version 8.7.1. The paper is entitled "Converting Standard Sun

    Config Files to Sendmail Version 8" and was written by Rick McCarty of

    Texas Instruments Inc. It is included in the distribution and is located

    in contrib/converting.sun.configs.





..............................................................................



Appendix A: Vendor Information



Below is information we have received from vendors concerning the

vulnerability described in this advisory. If you do not see your vendor's

name, please contact the vendor directly for information.



In addition to vendor information, note that the freely available Linux with

libc version 4.7.2, released May 1995, is not vulnerable.



- --------------------

Eric Allman



Neither sendmail version 8.7.3  nor 8.7.1 is vulnerable.  Sendmail is

available by anonymous FTP from



   http://info.cert.org/pub/tools/sendmail

   http://ftp.cs.berkeley.edu/ucb/sendmail

   http://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/mirrors/ftp.cs.berkeley.edu/ucb/sendmail

   http://ftp.cert.dfn.de/pub/tools/net/sendmail



MD5 (sendmail.8.7.3.tar.Z) = 3c3891c92500d12d60a61aaa1d01b533



- --------------------

Berkeley Software Design, Inc.



Users of BSD/OS V2.0 and V2.0.1 by Berkeley Software Design, Inc. should

install patch U201-001 which works for both versions. The patch is available

to all BSDI customers in:  http://ftp.bsdi.com/bsdi/patches/



md5 checksum: 88b3fd8c83a5926589d7b87b55bc4e14



- --------------------

Convex Computer Corporation



The CERT Coordination Center inadvertently omitted the Convex entry

from the original advisory:



Vulnerable:  ConvexOS (all releases)

             SPPUX (all releases)



A patch is being developed to address this vulnerability in currently

supported releases as detailed below.  Contact the Convex Technical

Assistance Center 1-800-952-0379 to obtain information and patches.



There are no known automated attack programs in existence for Convex or

SPP architectures.  Development of such a program would require access

to such a machine, as well as detailed knowledge of the architecture.

However, the only completely secure work-around at this time would be to

disable sendmail (known to have been successfully attacked on other

architectures), as well as other daemons which can potentially log

user-supplied strings.  Note that the user-supplied strings do not have

to actually be routed by syslogd in order for this vulnerability to

occur.  At this time we do not have a canonical list of affected

software; sendmail is the only known-vulnerable agent.



It should also be noted that Convex machines make use of a "SPU"

workstation (also referred to as a "test station") which controls the

machine; these workstations are vulnerable if sendmail is enabled on

those workstations and the SPU or test station is located on an

accessible network.  Convex recommends disabling sendmail on SPU and

test-station workstations until a patch can be obtained from Convex.



Currently supported OS releases as of Sep 1, 1995:



        ConvexOS 10.1, 10.2, 11.0, 11.1

        SPPUX    3.x



- --------------------

Cray Research



Information about fixes for the syslog problem can be found in FN #2011,

dated October 10, 1995. Customers should receive this information from

their Cray Research service representative.



For all source installations, your Cray Research service representative can

obtain the fix via the getfix tool.



Due to the number of executables which use this library routine, it is not

possible to provide getfix packages for all binary installations. UNICOS

binary update packages 8.0.4.2 and 9.0.1.2 include this mod.



 FIX AVAILABILITY as of Feb. 1996

 --------------------------------

                         Release Level            Fix Package

 Affected Product        Containing Fix           Availability

 ================        ==============           ===========

 UNICOS 8.0             UNICOS 8.0.4.2 *         source only

 UNICOS 8.3             **                       source only

 UNICOS 9.0             UNICOS 9.0.1.2 ***       source only



 *   Released for all platforms.

 **  No more updates planned.

 *** Released for X-MP, Y-MP, C-90 and T-90 platforms but has not yet

     released for YMP-EL and J-90 platforms.





- --------------------

Data General Corporation



  The DG/UX operating system is NOT vulnerable to this problem.  This

  includes all currently supported release, DG/UX 5.4 Release 3.00, DG/UX 5.4

  Release 3.10, DG/UX Release 4.10 and all related Trusted DG/UX products.



- --------------------

Digital Equipment Corporation



For updated information, please refer to the Digital Equipment

Corporation Vendor Bulletin #96.0383, available in



         http://info.cert.org/pub/vendors/dec/dec_96.0383



Note:  Non-contract/non-warranty customers should contact

       local Digital support channels for information

       regarding these kits.



As always, Digital urges you to periodically review your system

management and security procedures. Digital will continue to review

and enhance the security features of its products and work with

customers to maintain and improve the security and integrity of their

systems.



- --------------------

Hewlett-Packard Company



Included below is information obtained from the February 7th, 1996,

Hewlett Packard Security Bulletin, HPSBUX9602-029 "Security

Vulnerability in HP-UX syslog(3) subroutine."



It has been found that all HP-UX systems prior to HP-UX 10.10 have

this vulnerability.



The vulnerability can be eliminated from releases 9.X and 10.0X of

HP-UX by applying a patch.  Releases of HP-UX prior to 9.X must

upgraded to release 9.X or higher to escape the vulnerability,

which is fixed in the HP-UX 10.10 release.  There are no work-around

solutions known.



Hewlett-Packard recommends that all customers concerned with the

security of their HP-UX systems either apply the appropriate

patch or change perform the actions described above as soon as

possible.



Hewlett Packard's HP-UX patches are available via email

and World Wide Web.



To obtain a copy of the HP SupportLine email service user's

guide, send the following in the TEXT PORTION OF THE MESSAGE to

support@us.external.hp.com (no Subject is required):



                      send guide



The users guide explains the process for downloading HP-UX

patches via email and other services available.



World Wide Web service for downloading of patches

is available via our URL:



                  (http://us.external.hp.com)



     Patches:

                 PHCO_6595 (series 700/800, HP-UX 10.0 & 10.01), or

                 PHCO_6598 (series 800, HP-UX 9.0 & 9.04), or

                 PHCO_6597 (series 700, HP-UX 9.0[1357]), or

                 PHCO_6224 (series 300/400, HP-UX 9.0, 9.01, 9.03 & 9.1), or

                 PHCO_6162 (series 700, HP-UX 9.08 BLS), or

                 PHCO_6161 (series 700, HP-UX 9.09 BLS), or

                 PHCO_6160 (series 700, HP-UX 9.09+ BLS), or

                 PHCO_6157 (series 700, HP-UX 10.09 BLS CMW).





     Availability:

             All patches are available now, except for the BLS patches,

             which will be available after 29 February, 1996.  Contact your

             FCO representative for patch availability.



Further details are provided in Hewlett-Packard Security Bulletin,

"HPSBUX9602-029 Security Vulnerability in HP-UX syslog(3) subroutine."



World Wide Web service for browsing of bulletins is available via

our URL:

                http://us.external.hp.com



     Choose "Support news", then under Support news,

     Choose "Security Bulletins"



- -------------------

IBM Corporation



        Both fixes are now currently available. Please reference the

        following fixes:

        AIX 4.1 - IX53718

        AIX 3.2 - IX53358



- --------------------

Open Software Foundation



OSF cannot reproduce the security hole in OSF/1. However we have reproduced

the problem with syslog(3).  We have a fix for the syslog(3) problem. Support

customers should contact OSF for the fix. The fix will be included in the

OSF/1 R1.3.2 update release.



- --------------------

The Santa Cruz Operation (SCO)



The "SCO Networking Maintenance Supplement for SCO OpenServer 5"

addresses the syslog() problem for all ELF binaries in the product.

This supplement is available in:



        http://ftp.sco.COM/Supplements/net100/



This includes all the standard network utilities that are often the

target of a syslog() attack, such as sendmail. The product also

includes a few COFF binaries that use syslog(). These binaries will

be corrected in an upcoming Supplement.



- --------------------

Silicon Graphics Inc.



Silicon Graphics released Security Advisory 19951001-01-P825 and patch 825

to address the specifics of CERT Advisory CA-95:13.  Please note that patch

1146 (Security Advisory 19960203-01-P1146) supersedes patch 825.  This patch

addresses additional security problems in the "sendmail" program.

Please refer to SGI Advisory 19960203-01-P1146 for further information

on these additional security problems, and the location and checksums of

this patch.



Silicon Graphics has continued to investigate the 8lgm reported syslog

vulnerability.  A review of utilities supplied with the IRIX 5.3, 6.0, 6.0.1

and 6.1 environments that use syslog has been performed.  Silicon Graphics

has not discovered any syslog vulnerabilities in these utilities.



Past SGI Advisories and security patches can be obtained via

anonymous FTP from sgigate.sgi.com or its mirror, ftp.sgi.com.



- --------------------

Solbourne (Grumman)



Solbourne 2.5 is not vulnerable.



- --------------------

Sony Corporation



NEWS-OS 6.0.3 and 6.1 are not vulnerable.



- --------------------

Sun Microsystems, Inc.



SunOS 5.5 is not vulnerable.



Sun Microsystems has made the following patches available to address this

vulnerability:



        PATCH #     VERSION                 RELEASED

        ---------   -----------             ------------

        100891-13 - SunOS 4.1.3             Oct 27, 1995 (International)

        101558-07 - SunOS 4.1.3_U1          Oct 27, 1995 (International)

        102545-04 - SunOS 4.1.4             Nov 16, 1995 (International)

        100890-13 - SunOS 4.1.3             Feb 21, 1996 (US only)

        101759-04 - SunOS 4.1.3_U1          Feb 21, 1996 (US only)

        102544-04 - SunOS 4.1.4             Feb 21, 1996 (US only)



        102903-01 - Solaris 2.3             Nov  2, 1995

        101945-37 - Solaris 2.4             Feb. 29, 1996

        102905-01 - Solaris 2.4_x86         Nov  2, 1995



Note also that the following patches:



        100890-13 - SunOS 4.1.3             Feb 21, 1996 (US only)

        101759-04 - SunOS 4.1.3_U1          Feb 21, 1996 (US only)

        102544-04 - SunOS 4.1.4             Feb 21, 1996 (US only)



require that you contact your Sun Solution Center or other SunSoft

authorized service provider (ASP) in the U.S. to obtain a copy of the

actual patch.



Sun Security Bulletins are available via the security-alert alias

(security-alert@sun.com) and on SunSolve (http://sunsolve1.sun.com).



- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The CERT Coordination Center staff thanks Eric Allman and Wolfgang Ley for

their involvement in the development of this advisory, and thanks Karl

Strickland and Neil Woods for reporting the vulnerability.

- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------



If you believe that your system has been compromised, contact the CERT

Coordination Center or your representative in the Forum of Incident

Response and Security Teams (FIRST).



If you wish to send sensitive incident or vulnerability information to

CERT staff by electronic mail, we strongly advise that the email be

encrypted.  The CERT Coordination Center can support a shared DES key, PGP

(public key available via anonymous FTP on info.cert.org), or PEM (contact

CERT staff for details).



Internet email: cert@cert.org

Telephone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)

           CERT personnel answer 8:30 a.m.-5:00 p.m. EST(GMT-5)/EDT(GMT-4),

           and are on call for emergencies during other hours.

Fax: +1 412-268-6989



Postal address:  CERT Coordination Center

                 Software Engineering Institute

                 Carnegie Mellon University

                 Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890

                 USA



CERT advisories and bulletins are posted on the USENET newsgroup

comp.security.announce. If you would like to have future advisories and

bulletins mailed to you or to a mail exploder at your site, please send mail

to cert-advisory-request@cert.org.



Past CERT publications, information about FIRST representatives, and other

information related to computer security are available for anonymous

FTP from info.cert.org.



- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Copyright 1995,1996 Carnegie Mellon University. Conditions for use,

disclaimers, and sponsorship information can be found in

http://www.cert.org/legal_stuff.html and http://ftp.cert.org/pub/legal_stuff .

If you do not have FTP or web access, send mail to cert@cert.org with

"copyright" in the subject line.



CERT is registered in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.





~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Revision history



Sep. 23, 1997  Updated copyright statement

Aug. 30, 1996  Information previously in the README was inserted

               into the advisory.

July 05, 1996  Appendix, Digital- Added pointer to updated information.

July 01, 1996  Appendix, SGI - Added additional information

Apr. 17, 1996  Appendix, SCO - Added an entry for SCO

Mar. 29, 1996  Appendix, Sun - Modified the Sun entry

Feb. 27, 1996  Appendix, Hewlett-Packard & Sun - Updated entries

Feb. 06, 1996  Appendix, Allman & Cray - Updated entries

Dec. 19, 1995  Appendix, Digital -  Modified Digital entry

Nov. 07, 1995  Appendix, IBM, SGI, Sun - Updated entries

Nov. 07, 1995  Sec. III.C - Added note recommending smrsh though it doesn't

                address the particular vulnerability described in the advisory

Oct. 27, 1995 - Appendix, Convex, Data General Hewlett-Packard, IBM - Added

                text



























-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0

Charset: noconv



iQA/AwUBOBTAzVr9kb5qlZHQEQJWcQCdF2n1e324qUcc4yYKnPnZywhQ2VQAnimp

QUKMwKwL2czyKEvK6BLTLBpX

=5DXh

-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----