|
|
Home : Advisories : TCP SYN Flooding and IP Spoofing Attacks
| Title: |
TCP SYN Flooding and IP Spoofing Attacks |
| Released by: |
CERT |
| Date: |
19th September 1996 |
| Printable version: |
Click here |
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
=============================================================================
CERT(*) Advisory CA-96.21
Original issue date: September 19, 1996
Last Revised: August 24, 1998
Updated vendor information for Silicon Graphics, Inc.
A complete revision history is at the end of this file.
Topic: TCP SYN Flooding and IP Spoofing Attacks
- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
*** This advisory supersedes the IP spoofing
portion of CA-95:01. ***
Two "underground magazines" have recently published code to conduct
denial-of-service attacks by creating TCP "half-open" connections. This code
is actively being used to attack sites connected to the Internet. There is,
as yet, no complete solution for this problem, but there are steps that can be
taken to lessen its impact. Although discovering the origin of the attack is
difficult, it is possible to do; we have received reports of attack origins
being identified.
Any system connected to the Internet and providing TCP-based network services
(such as a Web server, FTP server, or mail server) is potentially subject to
this attack. Note that in addition to attacks launched at specific hosts,
these attacks could also be launched against your routers or other network
server systems if these hosts enable (or turn on) other TCP services (e.g.,
echo). The consequences of the attack may vary depending on the system;
however, the attack itself is fundamental to the TCP protocol used by all
systems.
If you are an Internet service provider, please pay particular attention to
Section III and Appendix A, which describes step we urge you to take to
lessen the effects of these attacks. If you are the customer of an Internet
service provider, please encourage your provider to take these steps.
This advisory provides a brief outline of the problem and a partial solution.
We will update this advisory as we receive new information. If the change in
information warrants, we may post an updated advisory on comp.security.announce
and redistribute an update to our cert-advisory mailing list. As always, the
latest information is available at the URLs listed at the end of this advisory.
- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
I. Description
When a system (called the client) attempts to establish a TCP connection
to a system providing a service (the server), the client and server
exchange a set sequence of messages. This connection technique applies
to all TCP connections--telnet, Web, email, etc.
The client system begins by sending a SYN message to the server. The
server then acknowledges the SYN message by sending SYN-ACK message to
the client. The client then finishes establishing the connection by
responding with an ACK message. The connection between the client and
the server is then open, and the service-specific data can be exchanged
between the client and the server. Here is a view of this message flow:
Client Server
------ ------
SYN-------------------->
<--------------------SYN-ACK
ACK-------------------->
Client and server can now
send service-specific data
The potential for abuse arises at the point where the server system has
sent an acknowledgment (SYN-ACK) back to client but has not yet received
the ACK message. This is what we mean by half-open connection. The
server has built in its system memory a data structure describing all
pending connections. This data structure is of finite size, and it can be
made to overflow by intentionally creating too many partially-open
connections.
Creating half-open connections is easily accomplished with IP
spoofing. The attacking system sends SYN messages to the victim server
system; these appear to be legitimate but in fact reference a client
system that is unable to respond to the SYN-ACK messages. This means that
the final ACK message will never be sent to the victim server system.
The half-open connections data structure on the victim server system
will eventually fill; then the system will be unable to accept any new
incoming connections until the table is emptied out. Normally there is a
timeout associated with a pending connection, so the half-open
connections will eventually expire and the victim server system will
recover. However, the attacking system can simply continue sending
IP-spoofed packets requesting new connections faster than the victim
system can expire the pending connections.
In most cases, the victim of such an attack will have difficulty in
accepting any new incoming network connection. In these cases, the
attack does not affect existing incoming connections nor the ability to
originate outgoing network connections.
However, in some cases, the system may exhaust memory, crash, or be
rendered otherwise inoperative.
The location of the attacking system is obscured because the source
addresses in the SYN packets are often implausible. When the packet
arrives at the victim server system, there is no way to determine its
true source. Since the network forwards packets based on destination
address, the only way to validate the source of a packet is to use input
source filtering (see Appendix A).
II. Impact
Systems providing TCP-based services to the Internet community may
be unable to provide those services while under attack and for some
time after the attack ceases. The service itself is not harmed by the
attack; usually only the ability to provide the service is impaired.
In some cases, the system may exhaust memory, crash, or be rendered
otherwise inoperative.
III. Solution
There is, as yet, no generally accepted solution to this problem with
the current IP protocol technology. However, proper router configuration
can reduce the likelihood that your site will be the source of one of
these attacks.
Appendix A contains details about how to filter packets to reduce the
number of IP-spoofed packets entering and exiting your network. It also
contains a list of vendors that have reported support for this type of
filtering.
NOTE to Internet Service Providers:
We STRONGLY urge you to install these filters in your routers to
protect your customers against this type of an attack. Although these
filters do not directly protect your customers from attack, the
filters do prevent attacks from originating at the sites of any of your
customers. We are aware of the ramifications of these filters on some
current Mobile IP schemes and are seeking a position statement from
the appropriate organizations.
NOTE to customers of Internet service providers:
We STRONGLY recommend that you contact your service provider to verify
that the necessary filters are in place to protect your network.
Many networking experts are working together to devise improvements to
existing IP implementations to "harden" kernels to this type of attack.
When these improvements become available, we suggest that you install
them on all your systems as soon as possible. This advisory will be
updated to reflect changes made by the vendor community.
IV. Detecting an Attack
Users of the attacked server system may notice nothing unusual since the
IP-spoofed connection requests may not load the system noticeably. The
system is still able to establish outgoing connections. The problem will
most likely be noticed by client systems attempting to access one of the
services on the victim system.
To verify that this attack is occurring, check the state of the server
system's network traffic. For example, on SunOS this may be done by the
command:
netstat -a -f inet
Note that use of the above command depends on the OS version, for
example for a FreeBSD system use
netstat -s |grep "listenqueue overflows"
Too many connections in the state "SYN_RECEIVED" could indicate that the
system is being attacked.
...........................................................................
Appendix A - Reducing IP Spoofed Packets
1. Filtering Information
- ------------------------
With the current IP protocol technology, it is impossible to eliminate
IP-spoofed packets. However, you can take steps to reduce the number of
IP-spoofed packets entering and exiting your network.
Currently, the best method is to install a filtering router that restricts
the input to your external interface (known as an input filter) by not
allowing a packet through if it has a source address from your internal
network. In addition, you should filter outgoing packets that have a source
address different from your internal network to prevent a source IP spoofing
attack from originating from your site.
The combination of these two filters would prevent outside attackers from
sending you packets pretending to be from your internal network. It would also
prevent packets originating within your network from pretending to be from
outside your network. These filters will *not* stop all TCP SYN attacks, since
outside attackers can spoof packets from *any* outside network, and internal
attackers can still send attacks spoofing internal addresses.
We STRONGLY urge Internet service providers to install these filters in your
routers.
In addition, we STRONGLY recommend customers of Internet service providers to
contact your service provider to verify that the necessary filters are in
place to protect your network.
2. Vendor Information
- ---------------------
The following vendor(s) have reported support for the type of filtering we
recommend and provided pointers to additional information that describes how
to configure your router. If we hear from other vendors, we will add their
information to the "Updates" section at the end of this advisory.
If you need more information about your router or
about firewalls, please contact your vendor directly.
Cisco
-----
Refer to the section entitled "ISP Security Advisory"
on http://www.cisco.com for an up-to-date explanation of
how to address TCP SYN flooding on a Cisco router.
NOTE to vendors:
If you are a router vendor who has information on router capabilities and
configuration examples and you are not represented in this list, please
contact the CERT Coordination Center at the addresses given in the Contact
Information section below. We will update the advisory after we hear from you.
3. Alternative for routers that do not support filtering on the inbound side
- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
If your vendor's router does not support filtering on the inbound side of the
interface or if there will be a delay in incorporating the feature into your
system, you may filter the spoofed IP packets by using a second router
between your external interface and your outside connection. Configure this
router to block, on the outgoing interface connected to your original router,
all packets that have a source address in your internal network. For this
purpose, you can use a filtering router or a UNIX system with two interfaces
that supports packet filtering.
Note: Disabling source routing at the router does not protect you from this
attack, but it is still good security practice to follow.
On the input to your external interface, that is coming from the Internet to
your network, you should block packets with the following addresses:
* Broadcast Networks: The addresses to block here are network 0 (the all zeros
broadcast address) and network 255.255.255.255 (the all ones broadcast
network).
* Your local network(s): These are your network addresses
* Reserved private network numbers: The following networks are defined
as reserved private networks, and no traffic should ever be received
from or transmitted to these networks through a router:
10.0.0.0 - 10.255.255.255 10/8 (reserved)
127.0.0.0 - 127.255.255.255 127/8 (loopback)
172.16.0.0 - 172.31.255.255 172.16/12 (reserved)
192.168.0.0 - 192.168.255.255 192.168/16 (reserved)
- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
The CERT Coordination Center staff thanks the team members of NASIRC
for contributing much of the text for this advisory and thanks the many
experts who are devoting time to addressing the problem and who provided input
to this advisory.
- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
If you believe that your system has been compromised, contact the CERT
Coordination Center or your representative in the Forum of Incident Response
and Security Teams (see http://info.cert.org/pub/FIRST/first-contacts).
CERT/CC Contact Information
- ---------------------------
Email cert@cert.org
Phone +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)
CERT personnel answer 8:30-5:00 p.m. EST(GMT-5) / EDT(GMT-4)
and are on call for emergencies during other hours.
Fax +1 412-268-6989
Postal address
CERT Coordination Center
Software Engineering Institute
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890
USA
Using encryption
We strongly urge you to encrypt sensitive information sent by email. We can
support a shared DES key or PGP. Contact the CERT/CC for more information.
Location of CERT PGP key
http://info.cert.org/pub/CERT_PGP.key
Getting security information
CERT publications and other security information are available from
http://www.cert.org/
http://info.cert.org/pub/
CERT advisories and bulletins are also posted on the USENET newsgroup
comp.security.announce
To be added to our mailing list for advisories and bulletins, send your
email address to
cert-advisory-request@cert.org
- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Copyright 1996,1997 Carnegie Mellon University. Conditions for use, disclaimers,
and sponsorship information can be found in
http://www.cert.org/legal_stuff.html and http://ftp.cert.org/pub/legal_stuff .
If you do not have FTP or web access, send mail to cert@cert.org with
"copyright" in the subject line.
CERT is registered in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.
- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This file: http://info.cert.org/pub/cert_advisories/CA-96.21.tcp_syn_flooding
http://www.cert.org
click on "CERT Advisories"
==============================================================================
UPDATES
3COM
====
Please refer to the "Network Security Advisory" link on
http://www.3com.com/ for a thorough discussion of
how to address TCP SYN flooding attacks on a 3Com router.
Berkeley Software Design, Inc.
=============================
BSDI has patches available.
PATCH:
K210-021 (http://ftp.bsdi.com/bsdi/patches/patches-2.1/K210-021)
md5 checksum: c386e72f41d0e409d91b493631e364dd K210-021
This patch adds two networking features that can help defeat
and detect some types of denial of service attacks.
This patch requires U210-025 which provides new copies of
sysctl(8) and netstat(1) for configuration and monitoring of
these new features.
PATCH:
K210-022 (http://ftp.bsdi.com/bsdi/patches/patches-2.1/K210-22)
md5 checksum: 9ec62b5e9cc424b9b42089504256d926 K210-022
This patch adds a TCP SYN cache which reduces and/or
eliminates the effects of SYN-type denial of service attacks
such as those discussed in CERT advisory CA 96.21.
PATCH:
U210-025 (http://ftp.bsdi.com/bsdi/patches/patches-2.1/U210-025)
md5 checksum: d2ee01238ab6040e9b7a1bd2c3bf1016 U210-025
This patch should be installed in conjunction with IP source
address check and IP fragmentation queue limit patch
(K210-021) and SYN flooding patch (K210-022).
Additional details about these patches are available from
http://www.bsdi.com
http://ftp.bsdi.com
Hewlett-Packard Company
=======================
HPSBUX9704-060
Description: SYN Flooding Security Vulnerability in HP-UX
HEWLETT-PACKARD SECURITY BULLETIN: #00060
Security Bulletins are available from the HP Electronic
Support Center via electronic mail.
User your browser to get to the HP Electronic Support
Center page at:
http://us-support.external.hp.com
(for US, Canada, Asia-Pacific, & Latin-America)
http://europe-support.external.hp.com
(for Europe)
IBM Corporation
===============
Any system that is connected to a TCP/IP-based network (Internet or
intranet) and offers TCP-based services is vulnerable to the SYN flood
attack. The attack does not distinguish between operating systems,
software version levels, or hardware platforms; all systems are
vulnerable. IBM has released AIX operating system fixes for the SYN
flood vulnerability.
NOTE: If you are using the IBM Internet Connection Secured Network Gateway
(SNG) firewall software, you must also apply the fixes listed in
the next section.
The following Automated Program Analysis Reports (APARs) for IBM AIX
are now available to address the SYN flood attack:
AIX 3.2.5
---------
No APAR available; upgrade to AIX 4.x recommended
AIX 4.1.x
---------
APAR - IX62476
AIX 4.2.x
---------
APAR - IX62428
Fixes for IBM SNG Firewall
- -------------------------
The following Automated Program Analysis Reports (APARs) for the IBM
Internet Connection Secured Network Gateway firewall product are now
available to address the SYN flood and "Ping o' Death" attacks:
NOTE: The fixes in this section should ONLY be applied to systems running
the IBM Internet Connection Secured Network Gateway (SNG)
firewall software. They should be applied IN ADDITION TO the
IBM AIX fixes listed in the previous section.
IBM SNG V2.1
------------
APAR - IR33376 PTF UR46673
IBM SNG V2.2
------------
APAR - IR33484 PTF UR46641
Obtaining Fixes
- ---------------
IBM AIX APARs may be ordered using Electronic Fix Distribution (via the
FixDist program), or from the IBM Support Center. For more information on
FixDist, and to obtain fixes via the Internet, please reference
http://service.software.ibm.com/aixsupport/
or send electronic mail to "aixserv@austin.ibm.com" with the word "FixDist"
in the "Subject:" line.
Linux
=====
A patch for the linux kernel source is available from:
http://www.dna.lth.se/~erics/software/tcp-syncookies-patch-1.gz
The patch allows tcp/ip processing to continue as normal, until the queue gets
close to full. Then, instead of just sending the synack back, it sends a syn
cookie back, and waits for a response to IT before sending the synack. When
it
sends the cookie, it clears the syn from the queue, so while under attack, the
queue will never fill up. Cookies expire shortly after they are sent.
Basically this prevents people from filling up the queue completely. No one
flooding from a spoof will be able to reply to the cookie, so nothing can be
overloaded. And if they aren't flooding from a spoof, they would be getting a
cookie they would have to respond to, and would have a hard time responding to
all the cookies and continuing the flood.
Livingston Enterprises, Inc.
============================
Refer to the following Applications Note for more information on
configuring a Livingston IRX or PortMaster to help block outgoing SYN
attacks from an ISP's users:
http://ftp.livingston.com/pub/le/doc/notes/filters.syn-attack
Silicon Graphics, Inc.
=====================
Updated Silicon Graphics information concerning SYN attacks can be
found in SGI Security Advisory, "IRIX IP Spoofing/TCP Sequence Attack
Update," SGI Advisory 19961202-01-PX, issued on August 6, 1998.
Patches are available via anonymous FTP and your service/support
provider.
The SGI anonymous FTP site is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1) or its
mirror, ftp.sgi.com. Security information and patches can be found in
the ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches directories, respectfully.
For subscribing to the wiretap mailing list and other SGI security
related information, please refer to the Silicon Graphics Security
Headquarters website located at:
http://www.sgi.com/Support/security
Sun Microsystems, Inc.
======================
Sun published a bulletin on October 9, 1996--Sun security bulletin number
00136. Sun Security Bulletins are available via the security-alert@sun.com
alias and on SunSolve.
Note: Advisories from vendors listed in this section can also be found at
http://info.cert.org/pub/vendors/
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Revision history
Aug. 24, 1998 Updated vendor information for Silicon Graphics, Inc.
Nov. 14, 1997 Replaced missing text in the introduction.
Sep, 24, 1997 Updated copyright statement
July 18, 1997 Updates - added information for Linux.
May 08, 1997 Updates - updated vendor information for Hewlett-Packard.
Jan. 02, 1997 Updates - added or modified vendor information for SGI,
Livingston, HP, 3COM.
Dec. 19, 1996 Updates - corrected Sun Microsystems security-alert email
address.
Dec. 10, 1996 Appendix A, #3 - corrected next to last reserved private
network number entry.
Dec. 09, 1996 Updates - added IBM patch information.
Nov. 12, 1996 Introduction, paragraph 2 - added some clarification.
Oct. 10, 1996 Updates - added a pointer to Sun Microsystems advisory.
added a pointer to the CERT /pub/vendors directory.
Oct. 08, 1996 Appendix A, #3 - revised the last item, reserved private
network numbers
Updates - added BSDI patch information.
Oct. 07, 1996 Updates - added a pointer to Silicon Graphics advisory.
Sep. 24, 1996 Modified the supersession statement.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0
Charset: noconv
iQA/AwUBOBS801r9kb5qlZHQEQKrxACgk3J6EaQisNABo2jh3HfwoysJr0IAnA8O
ecdUm0GM5o6U6U85ZYejgfax
=LZlK
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
|
