Advisories : Multiple Vulnerabilities in BIND

main menu

- feedback
- advertising
- privacy
- FightAIDS
- newsletter
- news

discussions

- read forum
- new topic
- search

meetings

- meetings list
- recent additions
- add your info

top 100 sites

- visit top sites
- sign up now
- members

webmasters

- add your url
- add domain
- search box
- link to us

projects

- our projects
- free email

m4d network

- security software
- secureroot
- m4d.com

Home : Advisories : Multiple Vulnerabilities in BIND

Title:	Multiple Vulnerabilities in BIND
Released by:	CERT
Date:	8th April 1998
Printable version:	Click here

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Hash: SHA1

=============================================================================

CERT* Advisory CA-98.05

Original issue date: April 08, 1998

Last Revised: November 16, 1998

Added vendor information for Data General

A complete revision history is at the end of this file.

Topic: Multiple Vulnerabilities in BIND

1. Inverse Query Buffer Overrun in BIND 4.9 and BIND 8 Releases

2. Denial-of-Service Vulnerabilities in BIND 4.9 and BIND 8 Releases

3. Denial-of-Service Vulnerability in BIND 8 Releases

- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------

I. Description

This advisory describes three distinct problems in BIND. Topic 1

describes a vulnerability that may allow a remote intruder to gain root

access on your name server or to disrupt normal operation of your name

server. Topics 2 and 3 deal with vulnerabilities that can allow an

intruder to disrupt your name server. Detailed descriptions of each

problem and its solutions are included in the individual sections on each

topic.

II. Impact

Topic 1: A remote intruder can gain root-level access to your name server.

Topics 2 and 3: A remote intruder is able to disrupt normal operation of

your name server.

III. Solution

All three problems can be fixed by upgrading to the latest version of

BIND, which may be available from your vendor (see Appendix A of this

advisory). Questions about the availability of patches from your vendor

should be directed to your vendor.

Additionally, the Internet Software Consortium has announced new

publicly available versions of BIND on the BIND WWW page

(http://www.isc.org/bind.html) and on the USENET newsgroup

comp.protocols.dns.bind.

Additionally, patches are provided for Topics 1 and 3, along with steps

to take until you can apply the patch or upgrade to the latest version of

BIND.

*************************************************************************

Topic 1: Inverse Query Buffer Overrun in BIND 4.9 and BIND 8 Releases

*************************************************************************

1.A. Description

BIND 4.9 releases prior to BIND 4.9.7 and BIND 8 releases prior to 8.1.2

do not properly bounds check a memory copy when responding to an inverse

query request. An improperly or maliciously formatted inverse query on a

TCP stream can crash the server or allow an attacker to gain root

privileges.

1.B. Determining if your system is vulnerable

The inverse query feature is disabled by default, so only the systems

that have been explicitly configured to allow it are vulnerable.

BIND 8

Look at the "options" block in the configuration file (typically

/etc/named.conf). If there is a "fake-iquery yes;" line, then the

server is vulnerable.

BIND 4.9

Look at the "options" lines in the configuration file (typically

/etc/named.boot). If there is a line containing "fake-iquery", then

the server is vulnerable.

In addition, unlike BIND 8, inverse query support can be enabled when

the server is compiled. Examine conf/options.h in the source. If the

line #defining INVQ is not commented out, then the server is

vulnerable.

1.C. What To Do

To address this problem, you can disable inverse queries, upgrade to BIND

8.1.2 now that it is available, or apply the patch (see below for more

information on the patch). We urge you to disable inverse queries until

you can take one of the other steps.

Disabling inverse queries

-------------------------

BIND 8

Disable inverse queries by editing named.conf so that either there

is no "fake-iquery" entry in the "options" block or the entry is

"fake-iquery no;"

BIND 4.9

Disable inverse queries by editing named.boot, removing any

"fake-iquery" entries on "options" lines. Look at conf/options.h

in the source. If INVQ has been defined, comment it out and then

rebuild and reinstall the server.

Note: Disabling inverse query support can break ancient versions of

nslookup. If nslookup fails, replace it with a version from any

BIND 4.9 or BIND 8 distribution.

Fixing the Inverse Query Code

-----------------------------

BIND 8

Upgrade to BIND 8.1.2 now that it is available

(http://www.isc.org/new-bind.html) or apply the patch available from:

http://ftp.cert.org/pub/cert_advisories/Patches/CA-98.05_Topic.1_BIND8_patch.txt

This file is not PGP signed. It has the following MD5 checksum:

MD5 (CA-98.05_Topic.1_BIND8_patch.txt) = 12fc9d395ff987b1aad17a882ccd7840

BIND 4.9

Upgrade to BIND 4.9.7 now that it is available

(http://www.isc.org/new-bind.html) or apply the patch available from:

http://ftp.cert.org/pub/cert_advisories/Patches/CA-98.05_Topic.1_BIND4.9_patch.txt

This file is not PGP signed. It has the following MD5 checksum:

MD5 (CA-98.05_Topic.1_BIND4.9_patch.txt) = 32da0db1c27e4d484e6fcb7901267c2f

Notes:

(1) We are asking sites to retrieve the patches via FTP rather

than including them in the advisory since our experience is

that some mail handling systems translate tabs into spaces.

This prevents the patch(1) program from working properly.

(2) We have not PGP signed the files since our experience is that

some implementations of PGP during the extraction process

will strip spaces from some lines containing whitespace only.

This may prevent the patch(1) program from working properly.

**************************************************************************

Topic 2: Denial-of-Service Vulnerabilities in BIND 4.9 and BIND 8 Releases

**************************************************************************

2.A. Description

BIND 4.9 releases prior to BIND 4.9.7 and BIND 8 releases prior to 8.1.2

do not properly bounds check many memory references in the server and the

resolver. An improperly or maliciously formatted DNS message can cause

the server to read from invalid memory locations, yielding garbage record

data or crashing the server. Many DNS utilities that process DNS messages

(e.g., dig, nslookup) also fail to do proper bounds checking.

2.B. Determining if your system is vulnerable

Any system running BIND 4.9 prior to 4.9.7 or BIND 8 prior to 8.1.2 is

vulnerable.

2.C. What To Do

There are no workarounds for these problems.

BIND 8

Upgrade to BIND 8.1.2 now that it is available.

BIND 4.9

Upgrade to BIND 4.9.7 now that it is available.

**************************************************************************

Topic 3: Denial-of-Service Vulnerability in BIND 8 Releases

**************************************************************************

3.A. Description

Assume that the following self-referential resource record is in the

cache on a name server:

foo.example. IN A CNAME foo.example.

The actual domain name used does not matter; the important thing is

that the target of the CNAME is the same name. The record could be in

the cache either because the server was authoritative for it or

because the server is recursive and someone asked for it. Once this

record is in the cache, issuing a zone transfer request using its name

(e.g., "dig @my_nameserver foo.example. axfr") will cause the server

to abort().

Most sites will not contain such a record in their configuration

files. However, it is possible for an attacker to engineer such a

record into the cache of a vulnerable nameserver and thus cause a

denial of service.

3.B. Determining if your system is vulnerable

If the BIND 8 server is not recursive and does not fetch glue, then

the problem can be exploited only if the self-referential resource

record is in a zone for which the server is authoritative.

If the global zone transfer ACL in the options block has been set to

deny access and has no self-referential CNAMEs in its authoritative

zones, then the server is not vulnerable.

Otherwise, the server is vulnerable. The nameserver is recursive by

default, fetches glue by default, and the default global transfer ACL

allows all hosts; so many BIND 8 servers will be vulnerable to this

problem.

(Note: the in.named(8) man page mentions that sending a SIGINT to the

in.named process will dump the current data base and cache to, by

default, /var/tmp/named_dump.db. Some sites may find this useful in

looking for self-referential CNAMEs. Please see the in.named(8) man

page for further details.)

3.C. What To Do

To address this problem, you can apply the workaround described below,

upgrade to BIND 8.1.2, or apply the patch provided at the end of this

section. Until you can upgrade or apply the patch, we urge you to use the

workaround.

Workaround

----------

First set the global zone transfer ACL to deny access to all hosts by

adding the following line to the "options" block:

allow-transfer { none; };

Next, explicitly authorize zone transfers for each authoritative zone.

For example, if the server was authoritative for "example", adding

allow-transfer { any; };

to the "zone" statement for "example" would allow anyone to transfer

"example".

None of the domains for which the server is authoritative should have

self-referential CNAMEs.

Fixing the Problem

------------------

Upgrade to BIND 8.1.2, now that it is available, or apply the patch

available from the following URL to the BIND 8.1.1 source:

http://ftp.cert.org/pub/cert_advisories/Patches/CA-98.05_Topic.3_BIND8.1.1_patch.txt

This file is not PGP signed. It has the following MD5 checksum:

MD5 (CA-98.05_Topic.3_BIND8.1.1_patch.txt) = 33f9dc2eaf221dd48553f490259c2a8b

Notes:

(1) We are asking sites to retrieve the patches via FTP rather

than including them in the advisory since our experience is

that some mail handling systems translate tabs into spaces.

This prevents the patch(1) program from working properly.

(2) We have not PGP signed the files since our experience is that

some implementations of PGP during the extraction process

will strip spaces from some lines containing whitespace only.

This may prevent the patch(1) program from working properly.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Appendix A - Vendor Information

Below is a list of the vendors who have provided information for this

advisory. We will update this appendix as we receive additional information.

If you do not see your vendor's name, the CERT/CC did not hear from that

vendor. Please contact the vendor directly.

Berkeley Software Design, Inc. (BSDI)

- -------------------------------------

1. BSD/OS 3.0/3.1 AS SHIPPED is not vulnerable.

Sites wishing to enable fake-iquery can install mod

M310-025, available at http://www.bsdi.com

2. BSDI will issue a 3.1 mod when a fix is available.

3. BSD/OS is not vulnerable, since we ship bind 4.9.6

Caldera Corporation

- -------------------

Workaround for Topic 1:

Disable inverse queries by editing named.conf so that either

there is no "fake-iquery" entry in the "options" block, or

so that the entry is "fake-iquery no;"

Workaround for Topic 2:

A workaround is to set the global zone transfer ACL to deny

access to all hosts by adding the following line to the

"options" block allow-transfer { none; };

Next, explicitly authorize zone transfers for each authoritative

zone.

For example, if the server was authoritative for "example", adding

allow-transfer { any; }; to the "zone" statement for "example"

would allow anyone to transfer "example".

None of the domains the server is authoritative for should have

self-referential CNAMEs.

Correction for both Topics:

The proper solution is to Upgrade to the bind-8.1.1-5 packages.

They can be found on Caldera's FTP site at:

http://ftp.caldera.com/pub/OpenLinux/updates/1.2/006/RPMS

The corresponding source code can be found at:

http://ftp.caldera.com/pub/OpenLinux/updates/1.2/006/SRPMS

The MD5 checksums (from the "md5sum" command) for these packages

are:

b63ace6eab6eee5cf0608c8a245b5e27 bind-8.1.1-5.i386.rpm

4123b0167f5d5769a87cd2d9542a74b4 bind-doc-8.1.1-5.i386.rpm

e1d506cbcc87d7c1de915d94d03281b1 bind-utils-8.1.1-5.i386.rpm

eec24c0f816244c4729281867fcebbab bind-8.1.1-5.src.rpm

Upgrade with the following commands:

rpm -q bind && rpm -U bind-8.1.1-5.i386.rpm

rpm -q bind-utils && rpm -U bind-utils-8.1.1-5.i386.rpm

rpm -q bind-doc && rpm -U bind-doc-8.1.1-5.i386.rpm

This and other Caldera security resources are located at:

http://www.caldera.com/tech-ref/security/

Data General

- ------------

This problem is fixed in revision R4.20MU04 of DG/UX. The following patches

are available for earlier revisions:

Revision Patch Number

- -----------------------------------

R4.20MU01 tcpip_R4.20MU01.p10

R4.20MU02 tcpip_R4.20MU02.p09

R4.20MU03 tcpip_R4.20MU03.p01

R4.11MU05 tcpip_R4.11MU05.p09

R4.12MU03 tcpip_R4.12MU03.p02

Digital Equipment Corporation

- -----------------------------

Digital is investigating this problem.

FreeBSD, Inc.

- -------------

We ship with INVQ not defined. This makes us resistent against the first

vulnerability. This is true for all release after 2.2.0 (2.1.* releases

are vulnerable but should be upgraded anyway). As we do not yet ship

BIND 8, we are also not vulnerable to the 3rd vulnerability.

We advise everyone to upgrade to BIND 4.9.7.

Hewlett-Packard Company

- -----------------------

See Hewlett-Packard Security Bulletin "Security Vulnerability in

BIND on HP-UX", HPSBUX9808-083, dated August 19, 1998, for details

concerning the availability of patches.

Hewlett Packard's HP-UX patches/Security Bulletins/Security patches are

available via email and/or WWW (via the browser of your choice) on HP's

Electronic Support Center (ESC).

To subscribe to automatically receive future NEW HP Security Bulletins from

the HP ESC Digest service via electronic mail, do the following:

From your Web browser, access the URL:

http://us-support.external.hp.com (US,Canada,Asia-Pacific, and

Latin-America)

http://europe-support.external.hp.com (Europe)

Remember to save the User ID assigned to you, and your password.

Once you are in the Main Menu:

To -subscribe- to future HP Security Bulletins,

click on "Support Information Digests".

To -review- bulletins already released from the main Menu,

click on the "Technical Knowledge Database (Security Bulletins

only)".

Near the bottom of the next page, click on "Browse the HP Security

Bulletin Archive".

Once in the archive there is another link to our current Security

Patch Matrix. Updated daily, this matrix is categorizes security

patches by platform/OS release, and by bulletin topic.

To report new security vulnerabilities, send email to

security-alert@hp.com

Please encrypt any exploit information using the security-alert

PGP key, available from your local key server, or by sending a

message with a -subject- (not body) of 'get key' (no quotes) to

security-alert@hp.com.

IBM Corporation

- ---------------

The version of bind shipped with AIX is vulnerable and the following

APARs will be available soon:

AIX 4.1.x: IX76958 (fix for Topic 1 only)

AIX 4.2.x: IX76959 (fix for Topic 1 only)

AIX 4.3.x: IX76960 (fix for Topic 1 and 3 only)

AIX 4.3.x: IX76962 (fix for Topic 1, 2, and 3. This is bind 8.1.2.)

Until the official fixes are available, a temporary patch can be found

at:

http://aix.software.ibm.com/aix/efixes/security

File sum md5

====================================================================

named.415.tar.Z 64980 157 0e795380b84bf29385d2d946d10406cb

named.421.tar.Z 44963 157 15a9a006abf4a9d0a0d3210f16d619e5

named4.430.tar.Z 48236 115 8377b14f74e207707154a9677906f20a

named8.430.tar.Z 51175 160 e2db14b7055a7424078456bfbfd9bf2d

Detached PGP signatures are also available with a ".asc" extension.

IBM and AIX are registered trademarks of International Business Machines

Corporation.

Internet Software Consortium

- ----------------------------

The Internet Software Consortium has announced BIND version 8.1.2 and

BIND version 4.9.7.

If you are running BIND 8.1.1 or 8.1 you want to upgrade to 8.1.2. If

you are still running BIND-4 rather than BIND-8, you need the security patches

contained in 4.9.7. But, you should really just run BIND-8.

The security fixes included in these releases fix a stack overrun that could

occur if inverse query support was enabled, and a number of denial of service

attacks where malformed packets could cause the server to crash.

Links to the kits are available on at:

http://www.isc.org/new-bind.html

NEC Corporation

===============

Topic1 - Some systems are vulnerable. Patches will be available

soon, especially for UX/4800 R11.x and R13.x.

Topic2 - Some systems are vulnerable. Patches will be available

soon after the release of bind-4.9.7, especially for

UX/4800 R11.x and R13.x.

Topic3 - We do not ship BIND 8 with our products so we are not

vulnerable to this problem.

Patches will be available from http://ftp.meshnet.or.jp/pub/48pub/security.

The NetBSD Project

- ------------------

The first problem can be fixed in NetBSD 1.3, 1.3.1, and -current prior

to 19980408 with the supplied BIND 4.9.6 patch. A patch will be made

available for the second problem shortly (alternatively, upgrading to

BIND 4.9.7 or 8.1.2 when available will also solve this problem.) NetBSD

is not affected by the third problem.

Red Hat Software, Inc.

- ----------------------

Red Hat fixes will be available at:

Red Hat 5.0

-------------

i386:

rpm -Uvh http://ftp.redhat.com/updates/5.0/i386/bind-4.9.6-7.i386.rpm

alpha:

rpm -Uvh http://ftp.redhat.com/updates/5.0/alpha/bind-4.9.6-7.alpha.rpm

Red Hat 4.2

-------------

i386:

rpm -Uvh http://ftp.redhat.com/updates/4.2/i386/bind-4.9.6-1.1.i386.rpm

alpha:

rpm -Uvh http://ftp.redhat.com/updates/4.2/alpha/bind-4.9.6-1.1.alpha.rpm

SPARC:

rpm -Uvh http://ftp.redhat.com/updates/4.2/sparc/bind-4.9.6-1.1.sparc.rpm

The Santa Cruz Operation, Inc.

- ------------------------------

The following SCO products are vulnerable:

- SCO Open Desktop/Open Server 3.0, SCO UNIX 3.2v4

- SCO OpenServer 5.0 (also SCO Internet FastStart)

- SCO UnixWare 2.1

- SCO UnixWare 7

SCO CMW+ 3.0 is not vulnerable as BIND/named is not supported on

CMW+ platforms.

Binary versions of BIND 4.9.7 will be available shortly from the

SCO ftp site:

http://ftp.sco.com/SSE/sse012.ltr - cover letter

http://ftp.sco.com/SSE/sse012.tar.Z - replacement binaries

The fix includes binaries for the following SCO operating systems:

- SCO Open Desktop/Open Server 3.0, SCO UNIX 3.2v4

- SCO OpenServer 5.0

- SCO UnixWare 2.1

- SCO UnixWare 7

For the latest security bulletins and patches for SCO products,

please refer to http://www.sco.com/security/ .

Silicon Graphics, Inc.

- ----------------------

Silicon Graphics Inc. issued Security Advisory, " IRIX BIND DNS

Vulnerabilities," 19980603-02-PX, August 6, 1998.

Patches are available via anonymous FTP and your service/support

provider.

The SGI anonymous FTP site is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1) or its

mirror, ftp.sgi.com. Security information and patches can be found in

the ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches directories, respectfully.

For subscribing to the wiretap mailing list and other SGI security

related information, please refer to the Silicon Graphics Security

Headquarters website located at:

http://www.sgi.com/Support/security

Sun Microsystems, Inc.

- ----------------------

Topic 1: Patches will be produced for Solaris 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.5.1

and 5.6.

Topic 2: Patches will be produced for Solaris 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.5.1

and 5.6.

Topic 3: Bug fix will be integrated in the upcoming release of

Solaris.

- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------

The CERT Coordination Center thanks Bob Halley and Paul Vixie of Vixie

Enterprises, who provided most of the text of this advisory.

Reminder:

The Internet Software Consortium will announce new publicly available

versions of BIND on the BIND WWW page (http://www.isc.org/bind.html) and

on the USENET newsgroup comp.protocols.dns.bind.

- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------

If you believe that your system has been compromised, contact the CERT

Coordination Center or your representative in the Forum of Incident Response

and Security Teams (FIRST). See http://www.first.org/team-info/.

We strongly urge you to encrypt any sensitive information you send by email.

The CERT Coordination Center can support a shared DES key and PGP. Contact

the CERT staff for more information.

Location of CERT PGP key

http://ftp.cert.org/pub/CERT_PGP.key

CERT Contact Information

- ------------------------

Email cert@cert.org

Phone +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)

CERT personnel answer 8:30-5:00 p.m. EST

(GMT-5)/EDT(GMT-4), and are on call for

emergencies during other hours.

Fax +1 412-268-6989

Postal address

CERT Coordination Center

Software Engineering Institute

Carnegie Mellon University

Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890

USA

Using encryption

We strongly urge you to encrypt sensitive information sent by email. We can

support a shared DES key or PGP. Contact the CERT/CC for more information.

Location of CERT PGP key

http://ftp.cert.org/pub/CERT_PGP.key

Getting security information

CERT publications and other security information are available from

http://www.cert.org/

http://ftp.cert.org/pub/

CERT advisories and bulletins are also posted on the USENET newsgroup

comp.security.announce

To be added to our mailing list for advisories and bulletins, send

email to

cert-advisory-request@cert.org

In the subject line, type

SUBSCRIBE your-email-address

- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

UPDATES

June 18, 1998

For additional information about attacks related to "named" (domain name

server software, part of BIND) please refer to the following Special

CERT Summary (and references therein):

http://www.cert.org/summaries/CS-98.05.html

- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

and sponsorship information can be found in

http://www.cert.org/legal_stuff.html and http://ftp.cert.org/pub/legal_stuff .

If you do not have FTP or web access, send mail to cert@cert.org with

"copyright" in the subject line.

* CERT is registered U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.

- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

This file: http://ftp.cert.org/pub/cert_advisories/CA-98.05.bind_problems

http://www.cert.org/pub/alerts.html

- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Revision history

Nov. 16, 1998 Added vendor information for Data General

Aug. 21, 1998 Updated vendor informaton for HP and SGI.

June 19, 1998 Updated vendor informaton for SGI.

June 18, 1998 Added a pointer to more information in the UPDATES section.

May 21, 1998 Updates were made to the following portions of this advisory:

III. Solutions

Topic 1: Inverse Query Buffer Overrun in BIND 4.9 and

BIND 8. Releases

1.C. What To Do

Fixing the Inverse Query Code, Bind 8 and Bind 4.9

Topic 2: Denial-of-Service Vulnerabilities in BIND 4.9 and

BIND 8 Releases

2.C. What To Do

Topic 3: Denial-of-Service Vulnerability in BIND 8 Releases

3.C. What To Do

Fixing the Problem

Appendix A - Updated vendor information for Internet Software

Consortium

Apr. 16, 1998 Appendix A - Updated vendor information for Caldera Corporation.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0

Charset: noconv

iQA/AwUBOBTBolr9kb5qlZHQEQJv6QCfZEPa1VU6Gb1G2rXRaOLe1DeAn5UAoJXm

GvAju57EmlHNVXx4KOCAzdRf

=zkzV

-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----