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Home : Advisories : Remotely Exploitable Buffer Overflow Vulnerability in mountd
Title: |
Remotely Exploitable Buffer Overflow Vulnerability in mountd |
Released by: |
CERT |
Date: |
12th October 1998 |
Printable version: |
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CERT* Advisory CA-98.12
Original issue date: October 12, 1998
Last Revised: November 9, 1998
Added vendor information for IBM Corporation and Silicon Graphics Inc.
Updated information for Data General
A complete revision history is at the end of this file.
Topic: Remotely Exploitable Buffer Overflow Vulnerability in mountd
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Affected systems:
NFS servers running certain implementations of mountd, primarily Linux
systems. On some systems, the vulnerable NFS server is enabled by default.
This vulnerability can be exploited even if the NFS server does not share
any file systems.
See Appendix A for information from vendors. If your vendor's name does not
appear, we did not hear from that vendor.
Overview:
NFS is a distributed file system in which clients make use of file systems
provided by servers. There is a vulnerability in some implementations of
the software that NFS servers use to log requests to use file systems.
When a client makes a request to use a file system and subsequently makes
that file system available as a local resource, the client is said to
"mount" the file system. The vulnerability lies in the software on the NFS
server that handles requests to mount file systems. This software is
usually called "mountd" or "rpc.mountd."
Intruders who exploit the vulnerability are able to gain administrative
access to the vulnerable NFS file server. That is, they can do anything the
system administrator can do. This vulnerability can be exploited remotely
and does not require an account on the target machine.
On some vulnerable systems, the mountd software is installed and enabled by
default. See Appendix A for more information.
We will update this advisory as we receive additional information. Please
check our advisory files regularly for updates that relate to your site.
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I. Description
NFS is used to share files among different computers over the network using
a client/server paradigm. When an NFS client computer wishes to access
files on an NFS server, the client must first make a request to mount the
file system. There is a vulnerability in some implementations of the
software that handles NFS mount requests (the mountd program).
Specifically, it is possible for an intruder to overflow a buffer in the
area of code responsible for logging NFS activity.
We have received reports indicating that intruders are actively using this
vulnerability to compromise systems and are engaging in large-scale scans
to locate vulnerable systems.
On some systems, the vulnerable NFS server is enabled by default. See the
vendor information in Appendix A.
II. Impact
After causing a buffer overflow, a remote intruder can use the resulting
condition to execute arbitrary code with root privileges.
III. Solution
A. Install a patch from your vendor.
Appendix A contains input from vendors who have provided information for
this advisory. We will update the appendix as we receive more information.
If you do not see your vendor's name, the CERT/CC did not hear from that
vendor. Please contact your vendor directly.
B. Until you install a patch, use the following workaround.
Consider disabling NFS until you are able to install the patch. In
particular, since some systems have vulnerable versions of mountd installed
and enabled by default, we recommend you disable mountd on those systems
unless you are actively using those systems as NFS servers.
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Appendix A - Vendor Information
Below is a list of the vendors who have provided information for this
advisory. We will update this appendix as we receive additional
information. If you do not see your vendor's name, the CERT/CC did not
hear from that vendor. Please contact the vendor directly.
Berkeley Software Design, Inc. (BSDI)
=====================================
BSDI systems are not vulnerable to this attack.
Caldera
=======
Caldera provided a fixed version as nfs-server-2.2beta35-2 on Aug 28. It is
available from
http://ftp.caldera.com/pub/OpenLinux/updates/1.2/013
10fdb82ed8fd1b88c73fd962d8980bb4 RPMS/nfs-server-2.2beta35-2.i386.rpm
59e275b1ed6b98a39a38406f0415a226 RPMS/nfs-server-clients-2.2beta35-2.i386.rpm
6b075faf1d424e099c6932d95e76fd6b SRPMS/nfs-server-2.2beta35-2.src.rpm
Compaq Computer Corporation
===========================
SOURCE: (c) Copyright 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 Compaq Computer
Corporation. All rights reserved.
SOURCE: Compaq Computer Corporation Compaq Services Software Security
Response Team USA
x-ref: SSRT0574U mountd
This reported problem is not present for the as shipped, Compaq's Digital
ULTRIX or Compaq's Digital UNIX Operating Systems Software.
- - Compaq Computer Corporation
Data General Corporation
========================
DG/UX is not vulnerable to this problem.
FreeBSD, Inc.
=============
FreeBSD 2.2.6 and above seem not be vulnerable to this exploit.
Fujitsu Limited
===============
Fujitsu's UXP/V operating system is not vulnerable.
Hewlett-Packard Company
=======================
Not vulnerable.
IBM Corporation
===============
The version of rpc.mountd shipped with AIX is not vulnerable.
IBM and AIX are registered trademarks of International Business Machines
Corporation.
NCR
===
NCR is not vulnerable. We do not do any of the specified logging, nor do we
have mountd (or normally anything else) hanging on port 635.
The NetBSD Project
==================
NetBSD is not vulnerable to this attack in any configuration. Neither the
NFS server or mount daemon are enabled by default.
The OpenBSD Project
===================
OpenBSD is not affected.
Red Hat Software, Inc.
======================
All versions of Red Hat Linux are vulnerable, and we have provided fixed
packages for all our users. Updated nfs-server packages are available from
our site at http://www.redhat.com/support/docs/errata.html
The Santa Cruz Operation, Inc.
==============================
No SCO platforms are vulnerable.
Silicon Graphics Inc.
=====================
Please refer to Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Advisory, "mountd Buffer
Overflow Vulnerability", Number: 19981006-01-I, distributed October 26, 1998
for additional information about this vulnerability.
Silicon Graphics provides a comprehensive customer World Wide Web site.
This site is located at http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/security.html.
Sun Microsystems, Inc.
======================
Sun's mountd is not affected.
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Contributors
Our thanks to Olaf Kirch and Wolfgang Ley for their input and assistance in
constructing this advisory.
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If you believe that your system has been compromised, contact the CERT
Coordination Center or your representative in the Forum of Incident
Response and Security Teams (see http://www.first.org/team-info/).
CERT/CC Contact Information
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Email cert@cert.org
Phone +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)
CERT personnel answer 8:30-5:00 p.m. EST(GMT-5) / EDT(GMT-4) and are on
call for emergencies during other hours.
Fax +1 412-268-6989
Postal address:
CERT Coordination Center
Software Engineering Institute
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890
USA
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This file is at: http://ftp.cert.org/pub/cert_advisories/CA-98.12.mountd
Also posted on the USENET newsgroup comp.security.announce
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Revision History
Nov. 9, 1998 Added vendor information for IBM and SGI
Updated information for Data General
Oct. 21, 1998 Added vendor information for Berkeley Software Design, Inc.
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