[ SOURCE: http://www.secureroot.com/security/advisories/9640323170.html ] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 CERT Advisory CA-99-12 Buffer Overflow in amd Original release date: September 16, 1999 Last revised: -- Source: CERT/CC A complete revision history is at the end of this file. Systems Affected * Systems running amd, the Berkeley Automounter Daemon I. Description There is a buffer overflow vulnerability in the logging facility of the amd daemon. This daemon automatically mounts file systems in response to attempts to access files that reside on those file systems. Similar functionality on some systems is provided by a daemon named automountd. Systems that include automounter daemons based on BSD 4.x source code may also be vulnerable. A vulnerable implementation of amd is included in the am-utils package, provided with many Linux distributions. II. Impact Remote intruders can execute arbitrary code as the user running the amd daemon (usually root). III. Solution Install a patch from your vendor Appendix A contains information provided by vendors for this advisory. We will update the appendix as we receive more information. If you do not see your vendor's name, the CERT/CC did not hear from that vendor. Please contact your vendor directly. We will update this advisory as more information becomes available. Please check the CERT/CC Web site for the most current revision. Disable amd If you are unable to apply a patch for this problem, you can disable the amd daemon to prevent this vulnerability from being exploited. Disabling amd may prevent your system from operating normally. Appendix A. Vendor Information BSDI BSD/OS 4.0.1 and 3.1 are both vulnerable to this problem if amd has been configured. The amd daemon is not started if it has not been configured locally. Mods (M410-017 for 4.0.1 and M310-057) are available via ftp from ftp://ftp.bsdi.com/bsdi/patches or via our web site at http://www.bsdi.com/support/patches Compaq Computer Corporation Not vulnerable Data General DG/UX is not vulnerable to this problem. Erez Zadok (am-utils maintainer) The latest stable version of am-utils includes several important security fixes. To retrieve it, use anonymous ftp for the following URL ftp://shekel.mcl.cs.columbia.edu/pub/am-utils/ The MD5 checksum of the am-utils-6.0.1.tar.gz archive is MD5 (am-utils-6.0.1.tar.gz) = ac33a4394d30efb4ca47880cc5703999 The simplest instructions to build, install, and run am-utils are as follows: 1. Retrieve the package via FTP. 2. Unpack it: $ gunzip am-utils-6.0.1.tar.gz $ tar xf am-utils-6.0.1.tar If you have GNU tar and gunzip, you can issue a single command: $ tar xzf am-utils-6.0.1.tar.gz 3. Build it: $ cd am-utils-6.0.1 $ ./buildall This would configure and build am-utils for installation in /usr/local. If you built am-utils in the past using a different procedure, you may repeat that procedure instead. For example, to build am-utils using shared libraries and to enable debugging, use either: $ ./buildall -Ds -b or $ ./configure --enable-debug=yes --enable-shared --disable-static You may run "./configure --help" to get a full list of available options. You may run "./buildall -H" to get a full list of options it offers. The buildall script is a simple wrapper script that configures and builds am-utils for the most common desired configurations. 4. Install it: $ make install This would install the programs, scripts, libraries, manual pages, and info pages in /usr/local/{sbin,bin,lib,man,info}, etc. 5. Run it. Assuming you have an Amd configuration file in /etc/amd.conf, you can simply run: $ /usr/local/sbin/ctl-amd restart That will stop the older running Amd, and start a new one. If you use a different Amd start-up script, you may use it instead. FreeBSD Please see the FreeBSD advisory at ftp://ftp.freebsd.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-99:06.amd .asc for information on patches for this problem. Fujitsu This vulnerability is still under investigation by Fujitsu. Hewlett-Packard Company HP is not vulnerable. IBM Corporation AIX is not vulnerable. It does not ship the am-utils package. OpenBSD OpenBSD is not vulnerable. RedHat Inc. RedHat has released a security advisory on this topic. It is available from our ftp server at: http://www.redhat.com/corp/support/errata/RHSA1999032_O1.html SCO Unix No SCO products are vulnerable. SGI SGI does not distribute am-utils in either IRIX or UNICOS operating systems. Sun Microsystems, Inc. SunOS - All versions are not vulnerable. Solaris - All versions are not vulnerable. _________________________________________________________________ The CERT Coordination Center would like to thank Erez Zadok, the maintainer of the am-utils package, for his assistance in preparing this advisory. ______________________________________________________________________ This document is available from: http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-99-12-amd.html ______________________________________________________________________ CERT/CC Contact Information Email: cert@cert.org Phone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline) Fax: +1 412-268-6989 Postal address: CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890 U.S.A. CERT personnel answer the hotline 08:00-20:00 EST(GMT-5) / EDT(GMT-4) Monday through Friday; they are on call for emergencies during other hours, on U.S. holidays, and on weekends. Using encryption We strongly urge you to encrypt sensitive information sent by email. Our public PGP key is available from http://www.cert.org/CERT_PGP.key If you prefer to use DES, please call the CERT hotline for more information. Getting security information CERT publications and other security information are available from our web site http://www.cert.org/ To be added to our mailing list for advisories and bulletins, send email to cert-advisory-request@cert.org and include SUBSCRIBE your-email-address in the subject of your message. Copyright 1999 Carnegie Mellon University. Conditions for use, disclaimers, and sponsorship information can be found in http://www.cert.org/legal_stuff.html * "CERT" and "CERT Coordination Center" are registered in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. ______________________________________________________________________ NO WARRANTY Any material furnished by Carnegie Mellon University and the Software Engineering Institute is furnished on an "as is" basis. Carnegie Mellon University makes no warranties of any kind, either expressed or implied as to any matter including, but not limited to, warranty of fitness for a particular purpose or merchantability, exclusivity or results obtained from use of the material. Carnegie Mellon University does not make any warranty of any kind with respect to freedom from patent, trademark, or copyright infringement. _________________________________________________________________ Revision History Sep 16, 1999: Initial release -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0 Charset: noconv iQA/AwUBOBTCFVr9kb5qlZHQEQLjqgCg2nU5Py49XJ5v1pltvGyQ/5WH7RsAoNXN zZti9JExWVjypVHXN0rRpIXa =8twF -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----